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MANDATORY ULTRASOUND STATUTES AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT, SHIFTING THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE. 
CHERI D. SMITH 
The jurisprudence of abortion law is replete with instances in which the 
concerns of the woman seeking the procedure have taken a back seat.  The newest 
battleground in abortion regulation involves mandatory ultrasound statutes touted 
as informed consent regulations.  The analysis of courts confronting these statutes 
has turned on whether the mandatory disclosures violate the physician’s First 
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech.  The particular breed of statute 
at issue in this paper requires a physician not only to perform an ultrasound, but 
also to make the images visible to the woman, to make audible the heartbeat, and to 
provide a simultaneous description of the images that highlights certain features of 
the fetus.  Four states have enacted these speech and display mandatory ultrasound 
requirements, namely Louisiana, North Carolina, Texas, and Oklahoma.  I argue 
that the woman’s right not to speak and to be free from unwanted speech are both 
implicated by this form of mandatory ultrasound statute, and as such, require a 
strict scrutiny analysis.  Her body is being used as a platform for the state’s 
message, and it is an essential component in the production of the compelled 
speech.  Applying a strict scrutiny analysis to the types of mandatory ultrasound 
laws at issue in cases in both the Fifth and Fourth Circuits, I conclude that the 
speech and display requirements do not satisfy the state’s compelling interest in 
protecting fetal life post-viability and promoting maternal health, nor are they 
narrowly tailored to achieve the legislation’s stated purpose. 
INTRODUCTION 
Heather Kay1 was elated to be pregnant with her first child.  Eager to see how 
the baby was progressing and to determine the sex, she and her husband received a 
routine twenty-week ultrasound.  Instead of learning whether they would be 
welcoming a he or a she into the world, Heather heard the words that no expectant 
 
 B.A. International Studies Summa cum laude, 2007, Baylor University; J.D. Candidate, May 2014, 
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. 
 1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to Heather Kay are taken from The Honorable Paul Stam, 
J.D., Woman’s Right to Know Act: A Legislative History, 28 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 41 (2012) [hereinafter 
Stam, WRKA Legislative History]. 
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parent wants to hear: the fetus had a severe brain abnormality described as 
“devastating and incompatible with life.”  After careful consideration, Heather and 
her husband decided to abort the pregnancy rather than let the child be born only to 
die a painful death in Heather’s arms.  For Heather, although heart wrenching, the 
process of securing an abortion was a dignified exchange between herself and her 
physician. 
Carolyn Jones2 received similar devastating news when she went in for a 
routine ultrasound.  It was then the doctor told her that her much anticipated son 
was severely deformed, and that if he survived until birth, he would live a life of 
constant pain.  Carolyn also chose to terminate the pregnancy instead of choosing a 
short and agonizing life for her child.  The difference between Carolyn and Heather 
is that Carolyn lives in Texas, where the state recently passed the Texas Women’s 
Right to Know Act (“H.B. 15”).3  Unlike Heather, in order to receive an abortion, 
Carolyn had to receive an ultrasound twenty-four hours before the procedure.  The 
new Texas law required that the physician display the sonogram, make audible the 
heartbeat, and describe the images to her.4  On the same day that Carolyn learned 
her baby was going to die, she also learned that her son had a well-developed 
diaphragm, four functioning chambers of the heart, arms, legs, fingers, and toes.5 
Heather told her story to North Carolina House Judiciary Subcommittee in 
hopes that hearing it would dissuade lawmakers from passing House Bill 854, a bill 
that contained nearly identical provisions to the Texas law.  Nevertheless, the North 
Carolina Women’s Right to Know Act (“H.B. 854”) passed in October of 2011 
with widespread support from lawmakers.6 
On December 19, 2011, a judge for the District Court for the Middle District 
of North Carolina granted a preliminary injunction on the H.B. 854 provisions 
requiring a woman seeking an abortion to receive an ultrasound in advance of the 
abortion procedure.7  While statutes requiring ultrasounds for abortions are fairly 
common,8 the North Carolina statute also required the physician to display the live 
ultrasound to the woman, and provide a detailed, simultaneous description of the 
 
 2 Unless otherwise noted, all references to Carolyn Jones are taken from Carolyn Jones, ‘We Have 
No Choice’: One Woman’s Ordeal with Texas’ New Sonogram Law, TEXAS OBSERVER (Mar. 15, 2012), 
http://www.texasobserver.org/we-have-no-choice-one-womans-ordeal-with-texas-new-sonogram-law/. 
 3 The Texas Woman’s Right to Know Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 
2012). 
 4 See id. 
 5 Although the Texas Women’s Right to Know Act has since been clarified to not require women 
in Carolyn’s situation to hear the verbal explanation or heartbeat, she still must receive the ultrasound.  
The North Carolina Women’s Right to Know Act includes no such exceptions, so if Heather’s situation 
occurred today, she would go through exactly what Carolyn went through. 
 6 The North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (West 
2011) (validity called into doubt by Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427 (M.D.N.C. 2011)). 
 7 See Stuart v. Huff, 834 F.Supp.2d 424, 427 (M.D.N.C. 2011). 
 8 See Danielle Muoio, Coalition Fights North Carolina Abortion Law, THE CHRONICLE (Dec. 9, 
2012), http://www.dukechronicle.com/articles/2012/12/10/coalition-fights-north-carolina-abortion-law. 
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images.9  The district court granted the preliminary injunction on the grounds that 
the “speech-and-display requirements violate[d] the First Amendment by 
compelling unwilling speakers to deliver the state’s message discouraging 
abortion.”10  On January 17 2014, the district court issued a final ruling on the 
merits; affirming the rationale of the preliminary injunction and finding that the 
physicians’ First Amendment rights were violated.11 
Also in 2011, the District Court for the Western District of Texas had reached 
the same conclusion with regard to its nearly identical mandatory ultrasound 
statute.12  However, on appeal, a unanimous Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated 
the district court’s ruling and found that under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,13 the state’s authority to regulate the medical profession 
surpassed the compelled speech concerns of the physician.14 
I will argue that both the Fifth Circuit and the District Court for North 
Carolina erroneously ignored the compelled speech concerns of the woman who is 
the subject of the ultrasound.  The state is using the woman’s body as a platform for 
the state’s message, and the woman’s body is an essential component in the 
production of the compelled speech.  Therefore, any mandatory ultrasound statute 
that requires the results to be displayed and described to a woman seeking an 
abortion implicates her First Amendment15 rights.  As the plaintiffs in Texas 
Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey I and II noted, “[w]hat 
makes the Act different is that it requires physicians, using information obtained 
from women’s own bodies, to be the mouthpiece for the State’s views and requires 
that women listen to those views.”16  With this in mind, I argue that the 
infringement on a woman’s First Amendment right requires a strict scrutiny 
analysis.  Even if Casey carved out an exception for regulating medical speech 
when it comes to abortions, that exception narrowly applied to medical providers 
and not to the women seeking the abortion. 
The woman’s right to not know if she so chooses is also implicated.  The 
Supreme Court addressed the rights of an unwilling listener in the case of Hill v. 
Colorado, and noted that the “right to be let alone [is one of] the most 
 
 9 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (West 2011). 
 10 See Stuart, 834 F.Supp.2d at 428 (adopting the reasoning of the plaintiffs that H.B. 854 was 
subject to strict scrutiny on First Amendment grounds because it compelled the physician’s speech and 
granted a preliminary injunction because the district court found that North Carolina had failed to 
articulate a legitimate compelling interest to overcome the strict scrutiny standard). 
 11 See generally Stuart v. Loomis, 2014 WL 186310 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014). 
 12 See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey I), 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 
958-59 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 13 See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 14 See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey II), 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th 
Cir. 2012). 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 16 Brief for Appellee at 21, Tex. Medical Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570 (2011)(No. 11-50814). 
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comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”17  In addition 
to the compelled speech argument, I also argue that as a captive audience and an 
unwilling listener, the First Amendment also protects the woman from having the 
state’s message forced upon her as a requisite for receiving an abortion. 
I.  HISTORY OF MANDATORY ULTRASOUND STATUTES 
A.  Abortion Regulation and Informed Consent 
The right of a woman to receive an abortion was first established in the case 
of Roe v. Wade,18 in which the Court held that the woman’s right to choose was 
part of her right to privacy protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.19  The right was not absolute, but “at some point, state interests as to 
protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant.”20  At 
the outset, Roe identified the inherent struggle between the woman’s right to 
privacy and the state’s compelling interest in protecting life.21  The interests of the 
attending physician were also given great care by the Roe decision.  Prior to the 
point where the state’s interest in potential life becomes compelling, “the attending 
physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation 
by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be 
terminated[; i]f that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an 
abortion free of interference by the State.”22 
Informed consent laws in the abortion context trace their legacy back to the 
Supreme Court’s rulings in the seminal cases of Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart.23  
At issue in Casey were several state-imposed restrictions on abortion, including a 
Pennsylvania abortion statute that required a physician performing an abortion to 
complete the following: 
[A]t least 24 hours before performing an abortion [the] physician [must] 
inform the woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the 
abortion and of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn 
child’[,] . . . the availability of printed materials published by the State 
describing the fetus and providing information about medical assistance for 
childbirth, information about child support from the father, and a list of 
 
 17 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-17 (2000) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 478 (1928) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 18 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) 
 19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 20 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992)). 
 21 Id. at 155-56. 
 22 Id. at 163. 
 23 Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
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agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives to 
abortion.24 
The Court determined the preceding informed consent requirements “may be 
permissible” so long as “the information the State requires to be made available to 
the woman is truthful and not misleading.”25  In regard to the compelled speech 
concerns of the physicians, the Court held that, “the physician’s First Amendment 
rights not to speak are implicated . . . but only as part of the practice of medicine, 
subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the state . . . [and w]e see no 
constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the 
information.”26  Specifically, the Court found that “[w]hatever constitutional status 
the doctor-patient relation may have as a general matter, in the present context it is 
derivative of the woman’s position.”27  The Court then determined that the 
informed consent provisions did not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because there was no evidence in the record that they placed an undue burden on a 
woman’s ability to receive an abortion.28 
Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court again reaffirmed the undue burden 
analysis of Casey in the case of Gonzales v. Carhart, where the Court analyzed the 
constitutionality of the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban.29  Where the Casey 
ruling articulated the state interests as the protection of the health of the mother and 
the potential life within her, the Carhart Court added that the state also has an 
interest in promoting medical ethics in regard to abortion practices.30  Carhart also 
expanded the scope of the state’s interest in informed consent to encompass the 
“lack of information concerning the way in which the fetus will be killed.”31 
Post-Casey, several state legislatures began to pass various informed consent 
requirements, typically mandating the dissemination of information regarding the 
risks of abortion, statistics about fetal development, and the alternatives to 
abortion.32  Generally, these laws have survived constitutional challenges due to 
 
 24 Casey, 505 U.S. at 881. 
 25 Id. at 882. 
 26 Id. at 884 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)) 
 27 Id. 
 28 The undue burden analysis is unique to abortion litigation and requires the court to determine 
whether the regulation places a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before 
fetal viability; if yes, then the regulation indeed places an undue burden and will be found to be an 
unconstitutional intrusion on the woman’s right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Casey, 
505 U.S. at 884. 
 29 See generally Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 30 See id. at 157; see also Robert M. Godzeno, Note, The Role of Ultrasound Imaging in Informed 
Consent Legislation Post-Gonzales v. Carhart, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 285, 296 (2009). 
 31 Although noting that there was no evidence before the Court, the Court nevertheless found that 
“it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life 
they once created and sustained . . . .  The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well 
informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with 
grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once 
did not know: [how the fetus died]. . .” Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159-60. 
 32 See Muoio, supra note 8. 
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courts’ determinations that the information required by the state was truthful, 
relevant, and not misleading.  For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recently upheld mandatory disclosures of an increased risk of suicide in women 
who undergo abortion procedures.33  The court held that: 
[W]hile the State cannot compel an individual simply to speak the State’s 
ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a 
physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a 
patient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also 
encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.34 
B. An Overview of Mandatory Ultrasound Laws 
The newest battleground over informed consent regulations involves 
mandatory ultrasound statutes.  An ultrasound, or sonogram, is a type of imaging 
procedure that uses sound waves to produce an image of the fetus in utero.35  There 
are two kinds of ultrasound procedures: transabdominal and transvaginal.36  The 
transabdominal procedure involves the familiar technique of moving a hand-held 
probe across the woman’s abdomen.37  Transvaginal ultrasounds are substantially 
more invasive, and require the physician to insert a probe into the woman’s vagina.  
Transvaginal ultrasounds are generally used before eight weeks gestational age due 
to the fact that a transabdominal ultrasound does not produce a clear image of the 
fetus or embryo at such an early stage in a pregnancy.38   
Generally, there are three kinds of mandatory ultrasound statutes.39  The first 
type of ultrasound law is the least invasive, and only requires that a physician 
performing an abortion must provide the woman with the opportunity to receive an 
ultrasound as part of the informed consent process for the procedure.40  In this first 
category, the woman is permitted to refuse.41  The slightly more demanding second 
category of ultrasound laws require a woman to receive an ultrasound regardless of 
her opposition to the procedure, and the physician must present her with the option 
to view the images.42  The third type of statute that is at issue in this paper requires 
 
 33 See Planned Parenthood Minn., N. D., S. D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 34 See id. at 893. 
 35 Pregnancy Ultrasound, MEDLINE PLUS (Feb. 21, 2010), 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003778.htm. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id.; see also Transvaginal Ultrasound, MEDICINE PLUS (July 11, 2012), 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003779.htm. 
 39 See Godzeno, supra note 29, at 304. 
 40 Id. (referencing ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-602(a) (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-3(4) (2006 & 
Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-609(3) (2004 & Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1(b) 
(West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17015(8) (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-
330(A)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2007)). 
 41 See id. 
 42 See id. (referencing ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
390.012(3)(d)(4) (West 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(C) (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-
SMITH_FORMATTE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/1/2014  9:49 AM 
2014] MANDATORY ULTRASOUND STATUTES 861 
a physician not only to perform an ultrasound, but also to make it visible to the 
woman, make audible the heartbeat, and provide a simultaneous description of the 
images highlighting certain features of the fetus.43  Four states have enacted the 
most invasive form of mandatory ultrasound requirements, namely Louisiana, 
North Carolina,44 Texas,45 and Oklahoma.46  According to a brief released by the 
Guttmacher Institute, thirty-five states currently require women to receive 
counseling before an abortion, twenty-seven detail the type of information women 
must be given, and twenty-six specify a time period that women must wait before 
an abortion.47  The North Carolina, Texas, and Oklahoma statutes combine all 
three.48  Because a majority of abortions occur before eight weeks, women are 
often subject to invasive transvaginal exams as a prerequisite for an abortion.49 
The Oklahoma Statute, Senate Bill 1878, was struck down in state court on 
state law grounds.50  In Nova Health Systems v. Pruitt, the District Court of 
Oklahoma held that the requirement violated the Oklahoma Constitution because it 
constituted an impermissible special law that singled out less than an entire class of 
similarly situated persons for different treatment.51  Federal district courts, 
however, have focused on the potential First and Fourteenth Amendment 
violations. 
C.  The Woman’s Right to Know Act and Lakey I & II. 
The Texas Woman’s Right to Know Act52 (“H.B. 15”) was originally passed 
in 2003, and required that physicians distribute certain state-prepared informational 
materials to women seeking abortions as part of the regulated practice of informed 
medical consent.53  In 2011, the Act was substantially amended to include the 
 
41-34(1) (West Supp. 2007)). 
 43 See id. 
 44 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (West 2012). 
 45 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2012). 
 46 OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§1-738.1A, 1-738.3d, & 1-738.3e (West 2012). 
 47 See Muoio, supra note 8. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See Nicholas Kristof, When States Abuse Women, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/opinion/sunday/kristof-when-states-abuse-women.html?_r=0; see 
also Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to A Protected Choice, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 351, 391 (2008) (citing Maureen Paul et al., The Roles of Clinical Assessment, Human 
Chorionic Gonadtropin Assays, and Ultrasonography in Medical Abortion Practice, 183 AM. J. 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY S34, S36 (2000); Prabha Sinha et al., Value of Routine Transvaginal 
Ultrasound Scan in Women Requesting Early Termination of Pregnancy, 24 J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNAECOLOGY 426 (2004)). 
 50 See Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, No. 2:12-CV-00395, 2012 WL 1034022 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Okla. 
Cnty. Mar. 28, 2012) (enjoining statute’s enforcement permanently). 
 51 Id. (citing OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 59). 
 52 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2012). 
 53 REGULATION OF ABORTION; CREATING AN OFFENSE, 2003 TEX. SESS. LAW SERV. CH. 999 (H.B. 
15) (West). 
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controversial ultrasound requirements at issue in Lakey I & II.54  In March 2013, 
two proposed amendments were introduced to the Texas State Legislature, one 
repealing the mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period before an abortion,55 and 
the other repealing the requirement that the physician who is to perform the 
abortion warn the patient about an increased risk of breast cancer.56  Neither of 
these amendments affects the most contentious aspects of the legislation. 
Specifically at issue in Lakey I & II were the compelled speech requirements 
of sections 171.012(a)(4)(B), (C), and (D); and section 171.012(a)(5), which the 
district court found unconstitutional.57  The sections at issue state the following: 
171.012(a)(4)(B), (C), (D): (B) the physician who is to perform the 
abortion displays the sonogram images in a quality consistent with current 
medical practice in a manner that the pregnant woman may view them; (C) 
the physician who is to perform the abortion provides, in a manner 
understandable to a layperson, a verbal explanation of the results of the 
sonogram images, including a medical description of the dimensions of the 
embryo or fetus, the presence of cardiac activity, and the presence of 
external members and internal organs; and  (D) the physician who is to 
perform the abortion or an agent of the physician who is also a sonographer 
certified by a national registry of medical sonographers makes audible the 
heart auscultation for the pregnant woman to hear, if present, in a quality 
consistent with current medical practice and provides, in a manner 
understandable to a layperson, a simultaneous verbal explanation of the 
heart auscultation.58 
The law provides for a handful of exceptions.  First, a woman is exempt from the 
ultrasound requirement if she is facing a medical emergency that places her “in 
danger of death or a serious risk of substantial impairment of a major bodily 
function unless an abortion is performed.”59  A woman may decline to hear the 
verbal explanation of the ultrasound results only if she certifies that she was: 
[P]regnan[t as] a result of a sexual assault, incest, or other violation of the 
Penal Code that has been reported to law enforcement authorities or that 
has not been reported because she] has a reason that she declines to reveal 
because she reasonably believes that to do so would put her at risk of 
retaliation resulting in serious bodily injury; or [she] is a minor and 
 
 54 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012. 
 55 H.R. 3744, 2013 Leg., 83d Cong. (Tex. 2013). 
 56 H.R. 2945, 2013 Leg., 83d Cong. (Tex. 2013). 
 57 See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey I), 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 
949 (W.D. Tex. 2011). 
 58 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (a)(4)(B -D). 
 59 Id. at § 171.0124 (allowing a physician to perform an abortion without getting informed consent 
in the event of a “medical emergency”); id. at § 171.002(3) (defining “medical emergency”). 
SMITH_FORMATTE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/1/2014  9:49 AM 
2014] MANDATORY ULTRASOUND STATUTES 863 
obtaining an abortion in accordance with judicial bypass procedures. . . or 
the fetus has an irreversible medical condition or abnormality.60 
1. Lakey I 
After the law’s passage, a group of Texas abortion providers immediately 
filed suit in federal court seeking to enjoin the law, in part based on the argument 
that the law “compel[led] physicians to engage in government-mandated speech . . . 
[and] . . . requir[ed] patients to submit to such speech, regardless of whether it is 
wanted or medically necessary” in violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.61  In Lakey I, the District Court for the Western District of Texas 
granted a preliminary injunction principally on the grounds that H.B. 15 violated 
the First Amendment prohibition against compelled speech, and was subject to 
strict scrutiny for three reasons.62  First, the district court noted that in Casey, the 
Supreme Court addressed an informed consent requirement in light of the 
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the First Amendment, and therefore the undue 
burden test was appropriate in that limited context.63  Second, the district court 
highlighted that the Casey Court “stop[ped] short of characterizing [the 
government’s interest in potential life] as ‘compelling’” until viability.64  And 
third, the district court found that Casey only went as far as to say that, “[i]f the 
information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not 
misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”65  Therefore, Casey approved of 
making information available to women in some cases, and did not give the 
government a “carte blanche” to “force physicians to deliver, and force women to 
consider, whatever information the government deems appropriate.”66 
The district court briefly addressed the unwilling listener constitutional 
concerns of the woman undergoing the procedure, and determined that the plaintiffs 
had not provided sufficient case law in support of their argument.67  Although the 
plaintiffs attempted to analogize the unwilling listener concerns of the woman to 
those addressed by the Supreme Court in Hill v. Colorado, the district court found 
Hill to be particularly distinguishable.68 
In Hill, the State of Colorado had enacted Colorado Rev. Stat. § 18–9–
122(3), which made it illegal for any person within one hundred feet of a health 
 
 60 Id. at § 171.0122(d); see also id. at 171.012(5). 
 61 Lakey I, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 949. 
 62 Id. at 96970. Although the H.B. 15 was challenged on multiple Constitutional grounds, for the 
purposes of this paper I focus only on the compelled speech and unwanted listener arguments pertaining 
to the First Amendment analysis. 
 63 Id. at 972. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Lakey I, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 958-59. 
 68 Id. (referencing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–17 (2000)). 
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care facility’s entrance to knowingly approach within eight feet of another person, 
without that person’s consent, in order to pass “a leaflet or handbill to, displa[y] a 
sign to, or engag[e] in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person.”69  
The law was passed in response to widespread harassment of women by anti-
abortion protestors as the women entered or exited abortion clinics.70 
In considering Hill, the Lakey district court found that the right to be left 
alone was not explicit, but applied narrowly to where the state imposed a restriction 
on speech in order to protect a private citizen’s interest in being free from unwanted 
speech.71  As such, the district court found that the right did not extend to situations 
in which the state itself imposes a message on an unwilling and captive audience.72  
However, the court did not entirely foreclose the unwilling listener argument: 
While the Court acknowledges the intuitive logic of Plaintiffs’ argument, 
and there surely are limits to the government’s power to impose whatever 
message it desires, on whomever it likes, under any circumstances it 
desires, those limits seem fairly undefined, at least as applied to this case. 
The most the Court can say is that Hill does not seem to support Plaintiffs’ 
argument.  Because Plaintiffs have not provided any case law in support of 
their argument, and the Court is not aware of any, it rejects Plaintiffs’ 
second argument.73 
In reaching its conclusion, the only First Amendment concerns that weighed 
on the district court’s decision were those pertaining to the compelled speech of the 
physician. 
2. Lakey II 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit summarily rejected the 
district court’s analysis and upheld H.B. 15.74  Writing for the court, Chief Judge 
Edith H. Jones distilled four “rules” from the combined holdings of Casey and 
Carhart.  First, an informed consent law is permissible so long as it requires 
“truthful, non-misleading, and relevant disclosures,” and does not impose an undue 
burden on the woman seeking the abortion.75  Second, informed consent laws are 
not ideological speech when they are part of the state’s reasonable regulation of the 
medical practice, and therefore they do not require a strict scrutiny analysis.76  In 
coming to this conclusion, the court reasoned that the Casey plurality’s response to 
 
 69 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000). 
 70 Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and Improper 
Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 32 (2003). 
 71 Lakey I, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 958. 
 72 Id. at 959. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey II), 667 F.3d 570, 580 (5th 
Cir. 2012). 
 75 Id. at 576. 
 76 See id. 
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the compelled speech claim was not a strict scrutiny analysis, because it did not 
inquire into compelling interests or narrow tailoring when analyzing the First 
Amendment claims of the plaintiffs.77  Therefore, the “physicians’ rights not to 
speak are, when part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing 
and regulation by the State[, and t]his applies to information that is ‘truthful,’ ‘non-
misleading,’ and ‘relevant . . . to the decision to undergo an abortion.’”78  Third, 
informed consent in the abortion context not only encompasses disclosing the 
physical and psychological risks associated with the procedure, but also provides 
space for the state to express its profound interest in the life of the fetus.79  The 
Cicuit Court found that Carhart served to enhance Casey’s holding by “uph[olding] 
a state’s ‘significant role . . . in regulating the medical profession, and add[ing] that 
‘[t]he government may use its voice and regulatory authority to show its profound 
respect for the life within the woman.’”80  Lastly, informed consent laws are not 
unconstitutional merely because they might have the effect of causing a woman to 
choose childbirth over abortion.81 
On the foregoing set of premises, the Fifth Circuit incorporated the undue 
burden analysis from Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence into the First 
Amendment analysis of the compelled speech claims of the plaintiff physicians.  
From this perspective, the court compared the informed consent provisions in H.B. 
15 to the printed materials at issue in Casey, and determined that “[t]hey are not 
different in kind, although more graphic and scientifically up-to-date,” and 
therefore fall within the category of “information about fetal development [that] is 
‘relevant’ to a woman’s decision-making.”82  H.B. 15 was thus upheld, and went 
into effect in May of 2013. 
D. The Woman’s Right to Know Act and Stuart v. Huff, Stuart v. Loomis 
Passed in 2011 over the objection of the Governor of North Carolina, the 
North Carolina Women’s Right to Know Act (“H.B. 854”) had a speech and 
display requirement almost identical to H.B. 15.83  According to the North Carolina 
legislature, informed consent requires that at least four hours before a woman is to 
receive an abortion, either the physician performing the abortion or a qualified 
technician: 
(1) Perform an obstetric real-time view of the unborn child on the pregnant 
woman.  (2) Provide a simultaneous explanation of what the display is 
 
 77 Id. at 575 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 
(1992)). 
 78 Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 882). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Lakey II, 667 F.3d at 576, (quoting Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 128 (2007)). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 578. 
 83 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (West 2012). 
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depicting, which shall include the presence, location, and dimensions of the 
unborn child within the uterus and the number of unborn children depicted. 
The individual performing the display shall offer the pregnant woman the 
opportunity to hear the fetal heart tone. The image and auscultation of fetal 
heart tone shall be of a quality consistent with the standard medical 
practice in the community. If the image indicates that fetal demise has 
occurred, a woman shall be informed of that fact.  (3) Display the images 
so that the pregnant woman may view them.  (4) Provide a medical 
description of the images, which shall include the dimensions of the 
embryo or fetus and the presence of external members and internal organs, 
if present and viewable.  (5) Obtain a written certification from the woman, 
before the abortion, that the requirements of this section have been 
complied with, which shall indicate whether or not she availed herself of 
the opportunity to view the image.84 
Originally introduced in 1981, the initial proposed legislation would have required 
a physician performing an abortion to provide the woman with information about 
adoption services and the complications and risks of an abortion procedure.85  
Although the bill passed the North Carolina Senate, it was not considered by the 
House.86  Again in 1989, the restyled Abortion Control Act, H.B. 1231 (N.C. 
1989), included similar provisions that mandated physicians performing abortions 
to make the woman aware of the associated risks and alternatives.87  The bill did 
not make it out of committee, and over the next decade it was amended and 
reintroduced until the Women’s Right to Know Act finally earned a Committee 
hearing and was subsequently passed in 2011.88 
After the passage of the law, North Carolina medical providers filed suit in 
federal court on behalf of themselves and their patients seeking abortions, 
challenging the constitutionality of the law under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.89  Like the plaintiffs in Lakey I & II, the North Carolina plaintiffs in 
the case of Stuart v. Huff also contended that the speech and display requirements 
“violate the First Amendment by compelling unwilling speakers to deliver the 
state’s message discouraging abortion.”90 
In December of 2011, North Carolina District Court Judge Catherine C. 
Eagles granted the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction enjoining the 
speech and display requirements of H.B. 854.  The court found that the speech and 
display requirements “are subject to strict scrutiny under traditional and 
 
 84 Id. at (1)-(5). 
 85 See Stam, supra note 1, at 9. 
 86 Id. at 10. 
 87 Id. at 10-11. 
 88 Id. at 11. 
 89 See generally Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011); Again, for the purposes of 
this paper I focus only on the compelled speech Constitutional challenges raised in this case and brought 
under the First Amendment. 
 90 Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 428. 
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longstanding First Amendment principles,” and that the law did not satisfy a 
compelling state interest, nor was it narrowly tailored.91 
In determining whether to apply a strict scrutiny analysis, the court reasoned 
that Casey did not purport to overrule longstanding First Amendment jurisprudence 
but rather applied the undue burden analysis to the informed consent provisions in 
the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the First.92  Where the Fifth 
Circuit found that the three sentences in which Casey dismissed the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment argument was the “antithesis” of strict scrutiny, the District Court of 
North Carolina held that “[t]he Supreme Court’s brief discussion of the First 
Amendment challenges to the Pennsylvania statute was undertaken separately and 
without substantial detail[; i]t seems unlikely that the Supreme Court decided by 
implication that long-established First Amendment law was irrelevant when speech 
about abortion is at issue.”93 
The district court opened the compelled speech analysis by asserting that the 
right to be free from engaging in government mandated speech is a tenet of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.94  Further, the court noted the historically dim view 
taken by the Supreme Court of content-based compelled speech, and reasoned that 
any such imposition by the government must satisfy strict scrutiny.95 
In December of 2012, the district court enjoined the real time speech and 
display requirements of the law, and a year later the case was decided on the merits.  
In Stuart v. Loomis the court found that H.B. 854’s mandated disclosure went 
beyond the bounds of Casey by “requir[ing] the provider to deliver in his or her 
own voice information the state deems relevant during the middle of a medical 
procedure in the exact manner dictated by the state, a much more significant 
intrusion.”96 
Six months after the first Stuart decision, in an unrelated case, the Fourth 
Circuit held that when it comes to mandatory disclosures in abortion regulation, 
Casey requires intermediate level scrutiny.97  The court noted that specifically, 
Casey dealt with “mandatory disclosures focused on the speech of licensed medical 
professionals. . . [and] the regulation of such professional speech was imposed 
incidental to the broader governmental regulation of a profession and was justified 
 
 91 Id. at 432. 
 92 See id. at 430. 
 93 Id. at 430. 
 94 See id. at 428 (citing Hurley v. Irish–Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 
U.S. 557, 573 (1995)). 
 95 Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943) (finding that the state could not compel students to pledge allegiance to the U.S. flag; also citing 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713, 715 (1977) (determining that New Hampshire could not force 
citizens to display the state’s ideological message on their vehicle license plates)). 
 96 Loomis, 2014 WL 186310 at *12. 
 97 Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 683 F.3d 539, 
554 (4th Cir. 2012) reh’g en banc granted, 11-1111 L, 2012 WL 7855859 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 2012) 
(citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
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by this larger context.”98  If Stuart moves up to the Court of Appeals under the 
current precedent established by Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy 
Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, H.B. 854 will likely be 
evaluated under an intermediate scrutiny standard with regard to the compelled 
speech of the physician.99 
III.  UNDUE BURDEN, STRICT SCRUTINY, AND SCHOLARLY DEBATE 
Before 2011, a number of scholars and legal analysts wrote a great deal on 
whether mandatory ultrasound laws would survive as the natural progression of 
informed consent under the undue burden analysis and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.100  Surprisingly, the Texas and North Carolina District Courts, as 
well as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, all analyzed the legitimacy of the 
mandatory ultrasound laws under the First Amendment from the perspective of the 
physician’s compelled speech claims.  The underlying dispute between the courts is 
whether to apply an undue burden test or a traditional strict scrutiny analysis to 
compelled speech in the abortion context.  Scholars have generally attempted to 
analyze mandatory abortion regulations from two perspectives: (1) the physician’s 
in regard to a first amendment challenge, or (2) the woman’s under a Fourteenth 
Amendment undue burden analysis. 
A.  Compelled speech and the First Amendment—the Physician’s Perspective 
Scott Gaylord, current law professor at Elon University School of Law, 
recently coauthored a law review article arguing that the “speech and display” 
requirements of mandatory ultrasound regulations that implicate the First 
Amendment should be subject to an undue burden rather than strict scrutiny 
analysis.101  Gaylord proffers that Casey explicitly rejected a strict scrutiny 
analysis because the plurality failed to consider the state’s compelling interests and 
narrow tailoring of the statute at issue.102  Instead, the Casey Court looked to 
whether the informed consent provision placed a substantial obstacle in the path of 
 
 98 Id. at 554. 
 99 On rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court improperly granted 
summary judgment when it concluded that the speech at issue was not commercial in nature.  Instead, 
the court found that a city ordinance requiring crisis pregnancy centers to post signs notifying potential 
clients that they did not provide abortion services could target commercial speech and subject only to 
rational basis review, however more discovery was needed on this point.  The court did not engage in 
any discussion of whether Casey requires strict or intermediate scrutiny for the compelled speech 
concerns of the physician, who is required to disclose a state mandated message to a patient.  See 
Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 283 
(4th Cir. 2013). 
 100 See generally Godenzo, supra note 30, at 323; see also Kaitlin Moredock, Ensuring So Grave A 
Choice Is Well Informed: The Use of Abortion Informed Consent Laws to Promote State Interests in 
Unborn Life, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1973, 1990 (2010). 
 101 Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and A Woman’s Right to Know: Ultrasounds, 
Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 595, 619 (2012). 
 102 See id. at 619-20. 
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the woman seeking an abortion.103  Additionally, Gaylord argues “in citing Wooley 
and Whalen, Casey expressly adopted a lower standard for compelled disclosures in 
the medical context, including disclosures relating to abortion.”104  The connection 
to Whalen v. Roe highlights the argument that when it comes to medical 
disclosures, the courts have traditionally refused to apply a strict scrutiny analysis.  
Whalen involved a New York statute that required physicians to disclose certain 
information about patients who had schedule II drug prescriptions.105  Although the 
State was requiring the physician to disclose information they otherwise would not 
have, the Court’s decision failed to address any potential compelled speech 
concerns pertaining to the physicians, turning rather on whether the mandatory 
disclosures violated the privacy rights of the patients.106  Gaylord asserts that 
Wooley stands for “a lower standard for compelled disclosures in the medical 
context” that Casey then extended to abortion procedures.107 
To conclude otherwise would cut against the Court’s decision in Casey, and 
yet this is exactly what the Texas and North Carolina district courts did, albeit in 
different ways.108  In Lakey I, Gaylord argues that the district court overlooked the 
underlying theme of Casey by narrowly distinguishing the cases based on the facts, 
noting that the informed consent provisions in Casey were limited to medically 
relevant information.109  Gaylord further asserts that Stuart inaccurately presumed 
Casey applied strict scrutiny to the First Amendment concerns of the physicians, 
even though the Stuart court simultaneously admitted that Casey identified no 
compelling interest of the state.110 
Because Casey specifically articulated that the state’s interest is not 
compelling until after viability, Gaylord contends that by approving informed 
consent provisions that applied to all stages of pregnancy, the Court affirmatively 
rejected a strict scrutiny analysis.111  After all, if Casey had applied strict scrutiny 
to the pre-viability informed consent provisions, the Court would have found them 
unconstitutional for lack of a compelling state interest.112  Additionally, Casey 
specifically noted that the physicians’ rights were derivative of the woman’s rights 
 
 103 See id. at 619 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,  877 (1992)). 
 104 Id. at 620 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (establishing that the First 
Amendment also protects the right not to speak); also citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977) 
(finding that a statute requiring mandatory disclosure of some patient information to state health 
employees did not infringe on the patient’s right to privacy, nor did it inhibit the practice of medicine, 
but was simply a necessary part of health care regulation)). 
 105 See Whalen, 429 U.S. 589 at 591. 
 106 See id. at 607. 
 107 Gaylord & Molony, supra note 101, at 620 (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715). 
 108 Id. at 620-621. 
 109 Id. at 621 (citing Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey I), 806 F. 
Supp. 2d 942, 974 (W.D. Tex. 2011)). 
 110 Id. (citing Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 (M.D.N.C. 2011)). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 624 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871, 877-78 (1992)).. 
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in a doctor-patient relationship.113  If a court were to apply both strict scrutiny and 
undue burden analysis to the same informed consent provisions, it would yield 
inconsistent results and is therefore unworkable as a legal standard in the abortion 
context.114 
Sarah Runels, writing for the Journal of Contemporary Law and Policy, 
adopts a different view.  She identifies three issues stemming from Casey that 
support a finding that mandatory informed consent provisions violate the 
physician’s First Amendment protection against compelled speech.115  First, 
although professional speech is subject to a lower level of constitutional protection, 
when physician’s speech is not related to the practice of medicine, it is entitled to 
the fuller protection of the First Amendment because it falls outside the realm of 
professional speech.116  Secondly, Casey provided no guidance on how to reconcile 
whether a regulation could satisfy a compelling interest while simultaneously 
presenting an unreasonable infringement of physician’s speech.117 Third, by not 
addressing what precisely constitutes a reasonable regulation of physician speech in 
relation to informed consent, Casey failed to adequately analyze the clash between 
the physician’s First Amendment rights and the state’s ability to regulate the 
medical profession.118 
Runels and others119 have argued that the courts must determine whether 
mandated speech falls under the category of professional speech, and therefore 
subject to a lower level of scrutiny, or whether it falls outside medical speech and 
therefore subject to strict scrutiny.120  In essence, this would require the courts to 
delve into whether the state mandated abortion disclosures were medically relevant 
to informed consent, and if not, then the physician’s compelled speech is not 
professional because it does not pertain to the practice of medicine.121 
Despite scholarly analysis of the topic,122 it remains unclear whether the 
Court intended to allow states a wide berth to impose mandatory abortion 
 
 113 See Gaylord & Malony, supra note 101, at 624. 
 114 Id. at 630. 
 115 See Sarah Runels, Informed Consent Laws and the Constitution: Balancing State Interests with A 
Physician’s First Amendment Rights and A Woman’s Due Process Rights, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 185, 197 (2009). 
 116 See id. (citing Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of 
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939 (2007) (analyzing compelled physician speech 
in informed consent provisions)). 
 117 Id. 
 118 See id. 
 119 See generally Post, supra note 116. 
 120 Runels, supra note 115, at 198. 
 121 Post, supra note 116, at 940. 
 122 See generally Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws 
Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2 (2012) (arguing that mandatory 
abortion disclosures require physicians to present patients with medically irrelevant information in an 
thinly veiled effort to present the state’s moral message about abortion, thus violating medical ethical 
standards); see also Sarah E. Weber, An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds As the 
Newest Tactic in Anti-Abortion Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REV. 359, 360 (2009) (arguing that state 
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disclosures as part of the legitimate regulation of the medical profession, or 
whether limitations exist when the disclosures exceed the realm of medically 
relevant information. 
B.  Undue burden analysis and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Generally, under an undue burden analysis, states are prohibited from placing 
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the stage 
of fetal viability. Although seeking to clarify the Court’s position in Roe by 
rejecting a strict scrutiny, rigid trimester framework, some have argued that Casey 
did little to address the exact parameters of the undue burden analysis and that 
appellate courts have applied the standard in a manner that inadequately protects 
the right to an abortion.123  Specifically, by neglecting to include a nexus element 
like those included in other constitutional standards of review,124 Casey has been 
misapplied, “render[ing] the undue burden standard insufficient to protect women’s 
reproductive autonomy.”125 
Emma Freeman126 argues that Casey intended the undue burden analysis to 
be on par with intermediate scrutiny.127  Although the Court couched the undue 
burden analysis in the familiar terms of rational basis review, speaking of the 
legitimate aim of the state and the reasonable measures taken to meet those aims, 
the Court still struck down the spousal notification provision as exceeding the 
state’s legitimate aim.128  Freeman argues that this implied nexus analysis belies 
Casey’s original intent to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny when considering 
an undue burden analysis.129  The undue burden standard is therefore a two-step 
process, whereby the court first determines whether the state has a legitimate 
interest that is rationally connected to the legislation, and second, whether the 
legislation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion pre-viability.130 
 
mandated abortion disclosures cut against the purported state aim of promoting the psychological well 
being of the woman, and also violate her right to refuse medical treatment). 
 123 See Emma Freeman, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis Review in Undue 
Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279 (2013). 
 124 See id. at 282-84.  Rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny all require a 
nexus between the government legislation and a legitimate governmental aim.  The undue burden 
analysis looks to whether a substantial obstacle has been placed in the path of the woman seeking an 
abortion and does not overly inquire into the nexus between the imposed regulation and the 
government’s legitimate aim. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Emma Freeman was named one of the twenty “most impressive” students at Harvard Law by 
Business Insider in a 2013 article.  See Max Rosenburg, 20 Incredibly Impressive Students at Harvard 
Law School Right Now, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/most-
impressive-harvard-law-students-2013-3?op=1. 
 127 Freeman, supra note 122, at 295–96, 282-284. 
 128 Id. at 293-94 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883, 885 (1992)). 
 129 See id. at 294 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 898). 
 130 Freeman, supra note 122, at 295–96, 301. 
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Applying this test to H.B. 15, Freeman argues that the Texas legislation fails 
to meet the state’s articulated legitimate ends on two fronts.131  First, the “opt out” 
provisions of the law whereby a woman can refuse to view the ultrasound or hear 
the heartbeat essentially thwart the state’s articulated goal of providing women with 
complete knowledge of the abortion procedure.132  Instead, H.B. 15 is well-tailored 
for an improper purpose, namely “to shame women for exercising the abortion right 
or make abortions more difficult to procure.”133  An improper purpose would thus 
render H.B. 15 invalid under an undue burden analysis, since the state’s aim is for 
the legislation to become a substantial obstacle.134  Without first analyzing the 
nexus between the regulation and the stated goal, it is unlikely that a court would 
strike down legislation such as H.B. 15 on a substantial obstacle analysis alone.  
Therefore, the nexus analysis is necessary to determine the purpose of the 
regulation.135 
Similarly, Professor Jeffrey Van Detta also laments the failing of Casey to 
articulate the standard of judicial review in regard to the undue burden analysis.136  
Van Detta argues that the state has a “concomitant governmental interest (or duty) 
in protecting a woman’s rights of choice and of reproductive autonomy,” that also 
must be considered in undue burden jurisprudence.137  On this ground, a showing 
that the motivation behind the legislation was to interfere with the woman’s 
freedom of reproductive choice would invalidate the statute as unconstitutional 
discrimination against women in the exercise of that right.138  Against this 
backdrop, an undue burden analysis must be wary of pre-textual claims of a 
legitimate interest in health or life when analyzing informed consent regulations 
that “morally Mirandize” women seeking an abortion.139  If the purpose or effect of 
the informed consent provision is to coerce women into childbirth, then the 
regulation cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.140 
When it comes to informed consent provisions, it remains unclear whether 
the Court will step in and elaborate on the undue burden standard, and whether 
mandatory abortion disclosures that remove a woman’s choice to refuse the 
 
 131 See id. 
 132 See id. at 310 (citing Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey II), 667 
F.3d 570, 579 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 133 Id. at 311. 
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. 
 136 Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Constitutionalizing Roe, Casey and Carhart: A Legislative Due-Process 
Anti-Discrimination Principle That Gives Constitutional Content to the “Undue Burden” Standard of 
Review Applied to Abortion Control Legislation, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 211, 215 
(2001). 
 137 Id. at 216. 
 138 See id. 
 139 Id. at 259. 
 140 See id. 
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information constitute a substantial obstacle due to the state’s purpose to limit 
abortions. 
III.  SHIFTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The jurisprudence of abortion is replete with instances where the concerns of 
the woman seeking the procedure have taken a back seat.141  A woman seeking an 
abortion is a “passive object, . . . [a] battleground on which the state and the 
physician stake out their interests.”142  In Roe, the Court noted that “the abortion 
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic 
responsibility for it must rest with the physician.”143  The Court later modified 
Roe’s holding in Casey to emphasize the state’s interest in protecting potential life, 
while simultaneously casting doubt on a woman’s ability to make a thoughtful and 
coherent decision about terminating her pregnancy.144  Against this backdrop, it is 
not surprising that the legal analysis emanating from the courts surrounding the 
constitutional validity of mandatory ultrasound statutes has turned on the 
compelled speech concerns of the physician and failed to recognize the implicit 
First Amendment concerns of the woman seeking an abortion.  Even less surprising 
is how legitimate Fourteenth Amendment undue burden challenges have become 
overshadowed by the analysis of the physician’s rights. 
I argue that the woman’s right not to speak, and to be free from unwanted 
speech are both implicated by the mandatory ultrasound statutes, and as such, 
require a strict scrutiny analysis.  Applying a strict scrutiny analysis to the types of 
mandatory ultrasound laws at issue in Lakey and Stuart, I conclude that the speech 
and display requirements do not satisfy the state’s compelling interest in protecting 
maternal life or fetal life post-viability, nor are they narrowly tailored to achieve the 
legislation’s stated purpose. 
A.  First Amendment Concerns of Women Seeking Abortions 
The protection of freedom of speech is a fundamental tenet of the U.S. 
Constitution.  The First Amendment notably states that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”145  The right to freedom of speech is not 
absolute, but subject to reasonable limitation by the state if the state regulation 
 
 141 Paula Abrams, The Scarlet Letter: The Supreme Court and the Language of Abortion Stigma, 19 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 293, 294 (2013). 
 142 Id. (citing Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks About Abortion: The Implications of 
a Shirting Discourse, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41, 47-8 (2008)). 
 143 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973); see also Calautti v, Franklin, 49 U.S. 379, 387 (1979) 
(“Roe stressed repeatedly the central role of the physician, both in consulting with the woman about 
whether or not to have an abortion, and in determining how any abortion was to be carried out.”) 
 144 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (“In attempting to ensure that 
a woman apprehend [sic] the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose 
of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating 
psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.”) 
 145 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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survives strict scrutiny.146  The Court has interpreted freedom of speech to include 
both verbal and non-verbal communication.147  Additionally, the Court has 
interpreted the First Amendment to include the freedom not to speak when one 
chooses to remain silent.148 
A woman seeking an abortion who is subject to one of the mandatory 
ultrasound statutes faces two potential First Amendment violations: (1) her body is 
being used as the medium to create the state’s ideological message, and (2) she is 
being forced to hear information that she would otherwise refuse to hear.  Both 
concerns sound in First Amendment protections and require a strict scrutiny 
analysis. 
1.  Compelled Speech, the Woman’s Body as a Platform for the States’ Message 
The mandatory ultrasound display and disclosure statutes fundamentally 
differ from any prior informed consent statutes that the court has dealt with by 
requiring complicity from the woman in the production of the state message.  There 
is no way to extricate the role that the woman plays in the ultrasound procedure.  
She is required by the state to allow her body to be used to produce an image that is 
then interpreted in carefully crafted terms to convey the state’s message.  To put it 
bluntly, “the image—a woman’s fetus—has been captured in her own gut and is 
offered for the very purpose of persuading her to save its life. . . there is a 
difference between the state providing information about the fetus in general and 
requiring a woman to produce an image of her own fetus.”149  In requiring a 
woman to submit her body to assist in the production of the state’s message, the 
state intimately violates her First Amendment right against compelled speech. 
a.  Protection from Compelled Ideological Statements, and Compelled Statements 
of Fact 
A fundamental aspect of the First Amendment is the right to be free from 
forced advertisement of the state’s ideological message.  This concept was 
articulated by the Court in Wooley v. Maynard, where a state law required New 
 
 146 There are a few exceptions to the application of strict scrutiny in regard to compelled speech.  
The first arises when the government restricts or mandates certain commercial speech.  Regulations 
pertaining to commercial speech (speech that is proposing a commercial transaction) are only subject to 
“a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First 
Amendment values.”  Ohralik v. Ohio St. Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).  Second, the government 
may regulate broadcast network programming at a lower level of scrutiny due to the limited broadcast 
spectrum that all providers are subject to, and the government’s interest in regulating frequency 
assignments.  See Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994). 
 147 See e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that displaying a motto on a license 
place qualified as protected speech); see also W. Va. St. Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
(finding that the act of saluting the flag constituted speech). 
 148 See generally Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (finding that 
the First Amendment also protects the right to refrain from speaking). 
 149 Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to A Protected Choice, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 394, 401 (2008). 
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Hampshire residents to display the state motto of “Live free, or Die,” on their state-
issued license plates or face criminal sanctions.150  The Court struck down the 
requirement, and upheld the right of a private individual to be free from using his 
private property as a “mobile billboard for the state’s ideological message.”151  In 
reaching its conclusion, the Court referenced the 1943 decision in West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette, where the Court held that a state could not 
require students to participate in a compulsory salute to the flag as a requisite for 
school attendance.152  Specifically, Barnette highlighted that by refusing to 
participate in a ceremony, the plaintiffs were not infringing on the constitutional 
rights of others.153  Rather, the “sole conflict is between [state] authority and rights 
of the individual,” articulated as the “right of self-determination in matters that 
touch individual opinion and personal attitude.”154  When it comes to compelling 
speech, the government is forbidden from requiring an individual to speak or 
display the state’s ideological message if the individual objects, including when the 
objection is based on individual opinion or attitude. 
Ideological state-sponsored messages are not the only kind of compelled 
speech forbidden by the First Amendment.  The state similarly cannot compel facts 
that the speaker would otherwise refuse to disclose.  In Riley v. National 
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., the Court recognized that “for First 
Amendment purposes, a distinction cannot be drawn between compelled statements 
of opinion and, as here, compelled statements of fact, since either form of 
compulsion burdens protected speech.”155  In Riley, the Court focused less on the 
form of the compulsion, and more on the effect or burden that it imposed on free 
speech.156 
To summarize, regardless of whether the compelled speech involves a state-
sponsored ideological message, or compelled statements of fact, the Supreme Court 
has recognized an infringement on the First Amendment right of self-determination 
to be free from speaking or displaying a message contrary to an individual’s 
morals, opinions, or attitude.  Such an infringement has traditionally required a 
strict scrutiny analysis.  Regardless of whether courts interpret the mandatory 
speech and display requirement as reflecting the state’s ideological message of 
preference for childbirth over abortion, or simply truthful, relevant, and non-
misleading facts, the distinction is extraneous when considering the infringement 
on the woman’s right to be free from compelled speech. 
 
 150 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632. 
 153 See id. at 630. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 782 (1988) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 156 See id. 
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b.  Protecting the Full Expression 
The nature of the compelled speech inherent in mandatory ultrasounds with 
speech and display requirements is unprecedented in that a woman’s body is 
integral to the production process of the state’s specific message. But for her 
complicity and the use of her body, the ultrasound images could not be produced.  
Even if the woman’s role is characterized as smaller than that of the physician who 
is actually required to speak out loud, Supreme Court precedent has found that the 
entire expression is protected by the First Amendment, including the various stages 
and elements of its production. 
Notably in Riley, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a state statute that 
required a charitable organization to publish certain spending information to their 
donors.157  Although the case dealt primarily with the level of scrutiny to apply in 
cases where the regulated speech was both commercial and private in nature, the 
Court made an important assertion regarding how to analyze multifaceted speech: 
Our lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled 
statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect 
of the compelled statement thereon. . . . Thus, where, as here, the 
component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, we cannot 
parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to 
another phrase. Such an endeavor would be both artificial and impractical. 
Therefore, we apply our test for fully protected expression.158 
When commercial speech is thus “inextricably intertwined” with another form of 
protected speech, the “mandated speech is subject to the test for fully protected 
expression.”159  When scrutinizing compelled speech, the Court does not analyze 
every element of the expression piecemeal, but rather looks to the speech taken as a 
whole and its effect.160 
The woman’s position in the production of the state’s message is unique, but 
not an entirely foreign concept to the Supreme Court.  The Court has often 
analyzed the stages and elements of production when determining the existence of a 
First Amendment violation.  For example, in Turner Broadcasting System Inc., v. 
F.C.C., the Court held that those who “engage in and transmit speech . . . are 
entitled to the protection of speech and press provisions of the First Amendment.161  
Turner recognized that “the Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech 
bearing a particular message are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny.”162 
 
 157 Id. at 784. 
 158 Id. at 796. 
 159 Id. at 782. 
 160 See id. 
 161 Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994). 
 162 Id. at 642. 
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Similarly, in Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual Group of 
Boston the Court overturned a state court decision that required a private council of 
parade organizers to admit the Gay Lesbian Bisexual Group of Boston into the 
procession on the grounds that denying the Group access violated a Massachusetts 
law that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of 
public accommodation.163  The Court held that private organizers of an “expressive 
parade” are entitled to First Amendment protection in the selection and 
organization process of the parade.164  Specifically, the Court noted that “a private 
speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious 
voices . . . [n]or, under our precedent, does First Amendment protection require a 
speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the 
communication.”165 
In like manner, the components of H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 that the Lakey and 
Stuart petitioners argue violate the First Amendment by compelling the physician’s 
speech also violate the free speech rights of the woman.  She is an essential 
component in the production process, a vital element in the creation of the state’s 
mandated expression. 
Assuming arguendo that Casey exempted mandatory abortion disclosures by 
physicians from strict scrutiny in the same way the Court exempted commercial 
speech, when considering the compelled speech of the woman, as well as that of 
the physician, the Court should apply protection for the complete expression.  As 
the Court highlighted in Casey, the “doctor-patient relation is derivative of the 
woman’s position,” therefore, the priority in consideration should be from her 
perspective.166  The ultrasound procedure required by H.B. 854 and H.B. 15 
depicts an image taken of the woman’s body, and the woman is compelled to allow 
her body to be used in the production of the image.  The resultant image is then 
displayed to her in real time, and the physician is then required to interpret it to her 
in the manner prescribed by the state.  The various elements and aspects involved 
in the production of the message cannot be parceled out, with intermediate scrutiny 
applying to one and strict to another.  As a whole, the expression must be protected. 
2.  Captive Audiences and Unwilling Listeners, the Right to Not Know 
The second manner in which the mandatory ultrasound requirements differ 
from all prior, accepted forms of informed consent statutes is that the woman is 
required to participate in the process, instead of merely being presented with the 
 
 163 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 561 (1995) 
(referencing MASS. GEN. LAWS § 272:98 (1992)). 
 164 Id. at 569. 
 165 Id. at 569–70. 
 166 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 838 (1992) (finding that an informed 
consent requirement did not infringe on the right to privacy between the woman and the physician 
because the physician’s rights in that context were derivative of the woman’s position). 
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opportunity to receive the information.  This type of mandated disclosure infringes 
on the rights of an unwilling listener under the captive audience doctrine.  When 
considering First Amendment protection, the unwilling listener/captive audience 
doctrine necessarily collides with the right to speak, and has therefore been more 
narrowly applied.  However, when the clash is between a private individual’s right 
to be free from unwanted speech and the speaker is the government, the 
government enjoys no First Amendment protection.167  Therefore, I argue that in 
the context of mandatory abortion disclosures, the government’s right to convey a 
message does not trump the listener’s right to avoid unwanted speech. 
The unwilling listener doctrine includes more variables than a free speech 
analysis, which typically is subjected to a simple strict scrutiny test.  The right of 
the unwilling listener, however, must be balanced against the protected freedom of 
speech in carefully crafted terms so as not to condone censorship of unpopular 
ideas.168  This balancing of interests is captured in the captive audience 
doctrine.169  As the Supreme Court established in Cohen v. California, “[t]he 
ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely 
to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that 
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable 
manner.”170  In determining where to draw the line between the rights of the 
listener and the rights of the speaker, the courts consider whether the audience is 
captive and therefore unable to avoid the speech.171  “[T]he First Amendment does 
not permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the ‘captive’ 
audience cannot avoid [the] objectionable speech . . . [or] should not have to quit 
the space to avoid the message.”172  The Court has expressly recognized this right 
in the home, on public transportation buses,173 and while entering or exiting 
medical facilities.174 
In the case of Hill v. Colorado, the Supreme Court recognized the 
fundamental right to be left alone as “the most comprehensive of rights and the 
 
 167 Sherry F. Colb, Some Reflections on the Texas Pre-Abortion Ultrasound Law, a Year After Its 
Passage, Part 2, JUSTICIA (Jun. 6, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/06/some-reflections-on-the-
texas-pre-abortion-ultrasound-law-a-year-after-its-passage-2. 
 168 See generally Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46, 55 (1988)); but see Heffron v. Int’l Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 
(1981) (holding that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at 
all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”). 
 169 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). 
 170 Id. 
 171 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988). 
 172 Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 939, 944 (2009) (citing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,447 U.S. 530, 541-42 
(1980); also citing Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487). 
 173 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300 (1974) (finding that “the streetcar 
audience is a captive audience . . . [being there] is there as a matter of necessity, not of choice.”). 
 174 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000) 
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right most valued by civilized men.”175  In upholding the Colorado statute 
prohibiting unwanted speech within 100 feet of a medical facility, the Supreme 
Court held that the unwilling listener’s “right to be left alone is most applicable in 
the home, but can also be protected in confrontational settings . . . [t]hus, this 
comment on the right to free passage in going to and from work applies equally—
or perhaps with greater force—to access to a medical facility.”176 
Similarly, women in both Texas and North Carolina are subjected to 
unwanted, anti-abortion speech within a medical facility, during an intimate exam 
that they are unable to refuse if they seek an abortion.  As Roe established, women 
have a right to an abortion, and therefore,  should not be required to quit the space 
to avoid the unwanted speech in the exercise of that right.  The woman both cannot 
avoid the speech if she is to have an abortion, and should not be required to, 
because the right to an abortion is constitutionally protected. 
In Lehman, the Court recognized that passengers on public buses were a 
captive audience because of the need that compels them to use public transit.177  
Similarly, many women facing an abortion do so out of environmental, medical, 
and economic reasons beyond their control.  This paper does not attempt to analyze 
the legitimacy of every woman’s reason to abort a pregnancy; however, I would 
suggest that if the Court has accepted the necessity of passengers on public transit 
(due to economic situation, need to travel to and from work or school), then the 
many reasons offered by women seeking an abortion also constitute necessity.178  
As one scholar has noted, “they are captive to their medical condition.”179 
The fact that the state is the one imposing the message on the woman does 
not negatively distinguish Hill, as the district court held in Lakey I, but rather 
highlights that when the government is the one imposing the message, it should be 
subject to stricter scrutiny.  Even if Casey carved out an exception to physicians’ 
speech in relation to abortion and informed consent, it was a narrow exception: “[i]f 
the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and 
not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”180  This narrow exception 
applied only to the compelled speech concerns of the physician, when merely 
offering information that the woman could refuse.  Likewise, as noted by the court 
 
 175 Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302. 
 178 A 2004 statistical analysis by the Guttmacher Institute revealed that women seek abortions 
primarily for the following reasons: (1) Inability to cope with the dramatic life change, such as an 
interference in education, employment, or because the mother is already caring for other children, (2) 
inability to afford to care for the child, (3) relationship problems and fears of single motherhood, (4) 
already completed childrearing, and (5) health concerns.  See Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons US 
Women Have Abortions, Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, GUTTMACHER INST., PERSPECTIVES 
OF SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH Vol. 37(3) (Sept. 2005), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3711005.html. 
 179 Corbin, supra note 172, at 1002. 
 180 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
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in Hill, “while speakers have a right to try and persuade others, ‘listeners have a 
right to be free from persistent importunity, following and dogging after an offer to 
communicate has been declined.’”181 
Women subject to mandatory ultrasound requirements meet the elements of a 
captive audience and deserve protection from unwanted speech.  Both H.B. 15 and 
H.B. 854 exceed the parameters set forth by Casey by requiring the woman to 
receive the information, even if she declines the offer to communicate.  Personal 
necessity drove the woman to elect an abortion, which she pursued in the privacy of 
the relationship between doctor and patient.  H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 invade that 
relationship, and mandate an intimate and personal procedure regardless of the 
woman’s objection.  Although H.B. 15 exempts some women from various 
provisions of the mandated disclosures, even a victim of rape or incest or a woman 
whose fetus has a devastating abnormality must submit to the ultrasound 
procedure.182  The North Carolina statute offers no such exceptions.  Also, even 
though H.B. 854 allows a woman to put on blinders and plug her ears to avoid 
hearing the description or seeing the images, her body is nevertheless compelled to 
participate in the unwanted production.183  The reality is that the woman is placed 
into gynecological stirrups, often given a transvaginal exam, and is required to stay 
until the physician is finished delivering the state sponsored speech.  The 
government enjoys no constitutionally protected freedom of speech, therefore, 
under the captive audience doctrine, the woman’s right as an unwilling listener 
must trump the right of the state to impose the message unless the state regulation 
satisfies strict scrutiny. 
B. The Mandatory Ultrasound Statutes Fail Under a Strict Scrutiny Analysis. 
Mandatory ultrasound regulations that carry speech and display requirements 
do not satisfy strict scrutiny because they fail to promote a compelling government 
interest, nor are they narrowly tailored.  The Court in Roe first articulated the 
government’s “important” interests in regulating abortion as “safeguarding health, 
in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life.”184  These 
interests became “compelling” at various points in a woman’s pregnancy according 
to the trimester framework.185  Roe’s holding was later modified in Casey, in 
which the Court held that the state’s “legitimate” interest in protecting the health of 
the woman and the life of the fetus begins at conception and endures throughout the 
 
 181 Corbin, supra note 172, at 946 (quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 717-18). 
 182 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §171.003(3) (West 2012). 
 183 See Loomis 2014 WL 186310 at *3. 
 184 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
 185 Id. at 162-63 (finding that the state’s interest in maternal health is compelling at the end of the 
first trimester, and the interest in the life of the fetus becomes compelling at the point of viability). 
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pregnancy.186  Casey maintained Roe’s holding that the state’s interest in 
protecting fetal life becomes “compelling” post-viability.187 
In Stuart v. Huff, the defendants asserted that H.B. 854 furthered the 
legitimate state interests of protecting women from potential psychological harm as 
a result of not being fully informed, reducing the possibility that women are 
“coerced” into abortions, and promoting childbirth over abortion.188  The 
defendants in Lakey I & II did not articulate the compelling government interest, 
but instead relied on Casey to exempt them from defending the statute from a strict 
scrutiny attack.189  Even if the state succeeded in articulating a compelling interest 
related to maternal health (including psychological factors), maintaining medical 
standards, protecting against coercion, and protecting fetal life, both H.B. 15 and 
H.B. 854 are not narrowly tailored to meet the alleged legitimate ends. 
State-mandated “content based [speech] regulations are presumptively 
invalid,”190 and “[i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its 
content will ever be permissible.”191  Indeed, “[t]he law is not free to interfere with 
speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a 
disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.”192  
In establishing whether a limitation on the First Amendment is narrowly tailored to 
achieve the government’s compelling interest, the government “must present more 
than anecdote and supposition.”  Specifically, in U.S. v. Playboy, the government 
argued that the least restrictive means of addressing a legitimate problem was 
inadequate, however there was insufficient evidence on the record to support the 
governments claims that the prior, less restrictive remedy, had failed to narrowly 
meet the government’s needs.  The Court noted that the government “has failed to 
establish a pervasive, nationwide problem justifying its nationwide daytime speech 
ban.193  Drawing from this conclusion, the government must demonstrate that 
existing regulations are insufficient to meet the government’s compelling interests, 
a requirement that both North Carolina and Texas have failed to do. 
First, although Casey established that the state has a legitimate interest in 
promoting fetal life, that interest does not become compelling until after fetal 
viability.194  Both H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 apply to all abortion procedures, the 
overwhelming majority of which occur pre-viability.195  The state’s interest in 
 
 186 Casey, 505 U.S. at 834. 
 187 Id. at 846. 
 188 Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011). 
 189 Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey I), 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 969 
(W.D. Tex. 2011). 
 190 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 191 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp. Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). 
 192 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995). 
 193 Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. at 823. 
 194 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); see also Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
 195 See Karen Pazol et al., Abortion Surveillance, United States 2009, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
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promoting fetal life does not supersede the First Amendment rights of the woman 
until after viability, therefore, both H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 are unconstitutionally 
over-broad and cannot survive a strict scrutiny on this front. 
Second, the mandatory ultrasound and accompanying description do not 
further the legitimate state interests in promoting maternal health, including her 
psychological health.  From the legislative histories of H.B. 15 and H.B. 854, it is 
clear that the intent of lawmakers was to humanize the fetus, causing the woman to 
connect with the images of her baby.196  The stated goal was to fully inform 
women of the consequences of choosing an abortion, namely terminating the life of 
her potential child, lest she discover later with devastating psychological 
consequences the full impact of her choice.  Lawmakers, however, offer no 
concrete support of this allegation save anecdotal testimony and reliance on 
language from Carhart, where the Supreme Court specifically noted a lack of 
evidence on the record pointing to the instance of psychological consequences for 
the woman.197  Instead, the American Psychological Association has conducted 
extensive research and concluded that there is no per se correlation between 
abortion and resultant psychological problems.198  H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 do not 
promote psychological health, but instead serve to undermine it by suggesting to a 
woman that her choice will destroy the life of her child.199  In essence, “[f]orcing 
an ultrasound on a woman as a psychological weapon to discourage her from 
having an abortion could lead to more psychological trauma.”200  By undermining 
the stated goal of protecting women from psychological harm, the mandatory 
 
& PREVENTION, (Nov. 23, 2012), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6108a1.htm?s_cid=ss6108a1_w (noting that only 
1.3% of abortions occur post viability). 
 196 See Andrew Kaspar, Senate Panel to Consider Abortion Law Requiring Women to View 
Sonograms, STATESMAN (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-
politics/senate-panel-to-consider-abortion-law-requiring-wo/nRXNK/ (highlighting that the author of 
H.B. 15, Texas Senator Dan Patrick called the bill an “emergency issue”, and if the bill would cause one 
in five women to choose adoption over abortion because she viewed her baby, then 16,000 lives would 
be saved). 
 197 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data to 
measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their 
choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”). 
 198 See generally BRENDA MAJOR ET AL., REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH 
AND ABORTION, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (2008), available at 
http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf. 
 199 See Sarah E. Weber, An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds As the Newest Tactic 
in Anti-Abortion Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REV. 359, 369 (2009) (“A woman who views the ultrasound 
images and listens to her physician explain that the fetus has a heartbeat, limbs, and is approximately x 
weeks of age, may begin to regard the fetus as a baby.  However, because of various factors, the woman 
proceeds with the abortion.  In this scenario, it is probable that a woman viewing the fetus as a ‘baby’ 
would experience more psychological harm after the abortion than if she had not viewed the 
ultrasound.”). 
 200 See id.; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (noting that childbirth and motherhood 
in the context of unwanted pregnancy also carries the risk of “imminent” psychological harm stemming 
from taxed “mental and physical health,” the distress on an unwanted child, and the sigma of unwed 
motherhood). 
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ultrasound and speech and display requirements of H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 fail to 
further the state’s interest in promoting maternal health. 
Third, H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 go beyond the state’s interest in regulating the 
medical profession by exceeding the traditionally acceptable scope of state-
influenced abortion informed consent provisions deemed constitutional by Casey.  
Again, it is important to highlight that the informed consent provisions in Casey 
involved making information available to women regarding alternatives to 
abortion, fetal development, state preference for childbirth, and possible health 
consequences.201  The Pennsylvania statute also contained an exception to the 
mandated informed consent if the physician could demonstrate “by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he or she reasonably believed that furnishing 
the information would have resulted in a severely adverse effect on the physical or 
mental health of the patient.”202  Prior to the passage of H.B. 15 and H.B. 854, both 
Texas and North Carolina already had informed consent provisions in place that did 
not run afoul of the parameters established by Casey.  Additionally, by requiring 
physicians to offer patients state-created materials regarding abortion, both Texas 
and North Carolina sufficiently guarded against the risk that physicians would fail 
to disclose pertinent information regarding abortions to the patient.  The increased 
requirements of H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 that allegedly aim to combat coercion and 
physician misrepresentation were enacted without any evidentiary records 
demonstrating that the prior informed consent regulations failed to achieve this 
purpose in such a manner that prompted further action by the state.203  A state 
regulation requiring the physicians to make available state-sponsored materials, 
with the woman’s option of refusal, would meet the state’s goal through the least 
restrictive means.  Because H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 exceed this boundary without 
any evidence that the increased regulation was necessary, the state fails to 
demonstrate that the regulations were narrowly tailored. 
In sum, regardless of what compelling interest is offered by the state to 
justify mandatory ultrasound regulations with speech and display requirements, 
these interests are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the state’s alleged 
legitimate aims.  Therefore, both H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 fail under a strict scrutiny 
analysis in light of the First Amendment rights of the woman whose body is being 
used to produce the state’s message. 
CONCLUSION 
Although abortion is first and foremost a woman’s issue, the evolving 
jurisprudence surrounding mandatory ultrasound regulations has placed the woman 
 
 201 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
 202 Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990)). 
 203 See Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (noting that there was no evidence 
on the record that the increased informed consent provisions of H.B. 854 reduced coercion). 
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in the background, watching from a distance as the physician and the state grapple 
over conflicting interests.  Especially striking in the recent decisions of Lakey I & II 
and Stuart is how the woman’s involvement in such an intimate procedure can be 
overshadowed so as to not even warrant mention in the legal arguments.  The 
woman’s body is quite literally being transformed into an interactive, state-
sponsored message with the underlying purpose of promoting childbirth over 
abortion.  Even more, the woman is forced into producing this message whether or 
not she consents to the procedure.  In states like Texas, and perhaps soon North 
Carolina, the mandatory ultrasound is a prerequisite for a woman who seeks to 
have an abortion.  If she desires to follow through with the abortion, she must first 
have the ultrasound.  Forced complicity in producing a state-sponsored message 
strikes at the very core of the First Amendment and the interests against compelled 
speech it was designed to protect.  Similarly, courts err in ignoring the 
constitutional captive audience and unwilling listener concerns of women who are 
forced to hear verbal descriptions of their fetuses, regardless of their objection.  As 
such, the woman’s First Amendment protection against compelled speech, and 
against being forced to be an unwilling listener, must become part of the 
constitutional analysis of the validity of mandatory ultrasound regulations that 
include speech and display requirements. 
 
